Manifestations passés

Symposium on Electronic Market Design in honor of Prof. Tuomas Sandholm

SGAICO

29.04.2016 14:00 - 29.04.2016 18:00
Universität Zürich, Dept. of Education
Kantonsschulestrasse 3 (Geb. KAB, Raum G-01) - 8001 Zürich Schweiz

The University of Zurich is inviting SGAICO members to the Symposium on Electronic Market Design in honor of Prof. Tuomas Sandholm of Carnegie Mellon University, USA.

 

The symposium is organized by Prof. Sven Seuken, Chair of Computation and Economics, from the Department of Informatics.

 

Details and registration can be found at www.ifi.uzh.ch/ElectronicMarketDesign

The University of Zurich is inviting SGAICO members to the Symposium on Electronic Market Design in honor of Prof. Tuomas Sandholm of Carnegie Mellon University, USA.

The symposium is organized by Prof. Sven Seuken, Chair of Computation and Economics, from the Department of Informatics.

The symposium will highlight the work of Prof. Tuomas Sandholm at the intersection of computer science and game theory, in particular his research on the design of electronic markets. At the symposium, Prof. Sandholm will give the keynote lecture, talking about his journey designing electronic markets, where he will specifically cover combinatorial auctions, automated mechanism design approaches to revenue maximization, and kidney exchange markets.Thomas Sandholm is also a winner of the IJCAI Computer and Thoughts Award.

Apart from Prof. Sandholm, we will have speakers from TU Munich (Prof. Martin Bichler), the University of Zurich (Prof. Sven Seuken), and the University of Cologne (Prof. Axel Ockenfels), who will speak on various aspects of (electronic) market design.

 

The Symposium will take place on Friday, April 29, from 14:00 - 18:00 at the University of Zurich and will be followed by a reception.

Please register at: http://www.ifi.uzh.ch/ElectronicMarketDesign where you also find more information.

 

SpeakerTitle
Prof. Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Keynote: Journey and new results in combinatorial auctions, automated mechanism design for revenue maximization, and kidney exchanges
Prof. Martin Bichler
TU Munich, Germany
All models are wrong, but some are useful: About spectrum auction design and challenges in market design
Prof. Sven Seuken
University of Zurich, Switzerland
Designing better combinatorial auctions: Algorithms, incentives, and bidding languages
Prof. Axel Ockenfels
University of Cologne, Germany
Engineering trust on eBay

 

 


Prix: kostenlos
Retour à la liste